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Abstract 
In this paper we use data from the British Labour Force Survey to analyse the 
characteristics of workers who provide work on the basis of a civil or commercial contract, but who 
are dependent on or integrated into the firm for which they work. We argue that these workers lose 
their rights under labour law, receive less favourable benefits from social security protection and 
are often beyond trade union representation and collective bargaining. In this paper we test two 
hypotheses: (1) Dependent self-employed workers are significantly different from both employees 
and (independent) self-employed individuals, thus forming a distinct group. (2) Dependent self-
employed workers have lower labour market skills, less labour market attachment and, thus, less 
autonomy than self-employed workers. The data support our hypothesis that dependent self-
employed workers are a distinct labour market group which differs from both employees and 
independent self-employed individuals. In comparison to employees, dependent self-employed 
workers tend to be male, older, married (small effect), Caucasian, with low education and a low job 
tenure. Our results suggest that dependent forms of self-employment are used by firms to increase 
labour flexibility. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The employment relationship between an employer and an employee is typically 
hierarchical, while relationships between firms are in comparison of a more equal nature. 
Over the last decades, we have seen an increase in outsourcing and subcontracting 
activities by firms, which appear to be replacing the hierarchy in firms by market forms of 
governance. However, there is evidence that an increasing share of outsourcing activities 
leads to the outsourced worker being both economically dependent on the firm she 
contracts with and being in hierarchical subordination to it (ILO 2003; EIRO 2002; OECD 
2000). Such relationships have been termed “dependent self-employment”. There is no 
consensus on how to define dependent self-employment since there is little sociological or 
economic research on this topic; so far, the debate has been mostly discussed amongst 
legal scholars.
1 
In a recent report, the ILO (2003) defines dependent self-employed workers as 
“workers who provide work or perform services to other persons within the legal 
framework of a civil or commercial contract, but who in fact are dependent on or 
integrated into the firm for which they perform the work or provide the service in 
question” (p. 9). In a report on the future of work and labour law for the European 
Commission, Supiot (2001) looks at self-employed workers that are “economically 
dependent on a principal” (p. 3) and in “permanent legal subordination” (p. 6) from their 
principal. The OECD (2000) claims that there has been an increase of jobs that “lie on the 
borders of wage and salary employment and self-employment”, including in particular 
contractors who work “in a dependent relationship with just one enterprise” and who have 
                                                 
1 For example, Burchell et al. (1999) and Collins (1990) for the UK; Dietrich (1996) for Germany; Lyon-
Caen (1990) for France. For international aspects see OECD (2000) and ILO (2003); Supiot (2001), EIRO 
(2002), Perulli (2003), and Sciarra (2004) provide an European perspective.   3
only “little or no more autonomy than employees, even when classified as self-employed” 
(p. 162). In a comparative study at the EU level, EIRO (2002) describes these workers as 
“economically dependent workers […] who are formally self-employed but depend on a 
single employer for their income” (p. 1). 
We argue that these workers, who are between independent self-employment and 
dependent employment, face two forms of dependence. The first dependence is an 
economic dependence, which means that workers carry some or all of the entrepreneurial 
risk. Because such workers have only one contractor they generate their whole income 
from this business relationship. If we assume that the two parties do not usually agree on a 
constant quantity of orders, but quite the contrary, namely that the amount of business 
depends on the economic situation of the firm the worker contracts with, the dependent 
self-employed worker obviously takes the entrepreneurial risk (i.e. the short-term risk of 
demand fluctuations). The second form of dependence relates to dependence in terms of 
time, place, and content of work. Whether a dependent self-employed worker is more 
similar to employees or to independent self-employed persons is determined by the degree 
of these two forms of dependency.  
Many governments have increased their efforts to foster self-employment and 
concerns about dependent self-employment have been raised in several European 
countries. Germany, Greece, Belgium, Italy and Austria have introduced policies to 
regulate dependent self-employment (OECD 2000). Dependent self-employed workers 
lose their rights under labour law, receive less favourable benefits from social security 
protection and are beyond trade union representation and collective bargaining. 
Recognising the lack of labour protection of dependent self-employed workers, there is an 
active legal and political debate on possible reforms across Europe. In a seminal   4
contribution, the “Supiot Report” (Supiot 2001) stresses that “those workers who cannot be 
regarded as employed persons, but are in a situation of economic dependence vis-à-vis a 
principal, should be able to benefit from the social rights to which this dependence entitles 
them” (p. 220). 
Despite the political debate on dependent self-employment, we know little about 
dependent self-employed workers. In this paper, we analyse the characteristics of 
dependent self-employed workers with data from the British Labour Force Survey. We 
investigate if, and how, dependent self-employed workers differ from employees and 
(independent) self-employed workers.  
Our empirical results indicate that dependent self-employment is concentrated in 
the construction and financial service sectors. Men have a greater risk of dependent self-
employment than women and our results suggest it is workers with little or no formal 
education who have a greater risk of dependent self-employment than those with more or 
higher formal education. We find that dependent self-employed workers show persistency 
in this labour market status, but also a low job tenure with the same employer. 
 
 
2.  Dependent Self-employment and Industrial Relations 
 
Observers have argued that the traditional scope of labour law and parts of social 
security law no longer reflect the organisation of work in today’s society (Sciarra 2004; 
Freedland 2003; Perulli 2003; Supiot 2001; Burchell et al. 1999). British labour law 
distinguishes a self-employed worker from an employee using criteria such as 
subordination, allocation of risk and degree of independence. Burchell et al. (1999) claim 
that this distinction is becoming increasingly difficult to apply. Freedland (2003: 18) 
argues that the dichotomist view of employees versus self-employed independent   5
contractors is based on a ‘false unity’ of the two concepts, leading to a ‘false duality’. The 
assumption underlying the rationale for this binary distinction is that labour law is thought 
to protect employees, who are regarded as the weak party to the employment contract. 
Self-employed persons, on the other hand, are seen as equal to the parties they contract 
with and are, thus, subject to market forces (Perulli 2003: 6f). New forms of work 
organisation underline that both concepts are fuzzy. 
The employment status under which a person carries out work matters because of 
the associated employment rights. Employment protection, social security and taxation 
vary with the employment status. For instance, self-employed persons are widely excluded 
from employment protection, e.g. paid holidays, and social security laws, e.g. 
unemployment insurance or benefits. The classification of employment statuses is 
therefore important not only from a legal, but also from a social point of view. 
In the UK, there is a high degree of uncertainty attached to the legal and social 
criteria by which workers are classified. As a result, certain groups of workers have been 
excluded from the social security system and also from the protection of employment 
legislation (Freedland 2003; Davies and Freedland 2000; Burchell et al. 1999; Freedman 
and Chamberlain 1997).  
In an empirical study on the operation of laws governing the classification of 
employment relationships in the UK, Burchell et al. (1999) estimate that around 30 per 
cent of those in employment hold an unclear employment status. They suggest that the use 
of the wider concept of ‘worker’ rather than that of ‘employee’ would increase the number 
of persons covered by employment rights by 5 per cent of all those in employment. More 
specifically, using a broader definition in labour law would include individuals who 
contract their own personal services to an employer without having a contract of   6
employment and who are (to some degree) economically dependent on the employer, 
because they derive a substantial part of their income from this employer. 
While British case-law has provided enough legal material to draw the line between 
an employee and a self-employed person, there are few decisions on the distinction 
between a dependent ‘worker’ and an independent self-employed person (Burchell et al. 
1999). Legal definitions of the employment status differ across legislation fields. The 
employment status of a dependent self-employed worker may be different for employment 
protection legislation, or for tax purposes, and different still for social security legislation. 
The consequence of such differences could result in a worker who would not profit from 
potential tax advantages of the self-employed status and would possibly not qualify for 
employment protection from unfair dismissal, or be eligible for redundancy compensation, 
statutory sick pay or statutory maternity pay (Freedman and Chamberlain 1997; Burchell et 
al. 1999). 
British legislation distinguishes between three different categories of the scope of 
labour law. First, an ‘employee’, as defined in the Employment Rights Act 1996, is an 
individual that works under a ‘contract of employment’. Second, in the 1970s, British 
legislation expanded some employment protection acts to the newly created category of 
‘employed persons’, introduced in the Equal Pay Act (1970), in parts of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975, and in the Race Relations Act 1976. ‘Employed persons’ are 
individuals with “any other contract personally to execute any work or labour” (Freedland 
2003: 23), going clearly beyond the definition of a ‘contract of employment’. Third, recent 
British legislation has attempted to classify dependent self-employed workers to some 
extent, by establishing the category of the ‘worker’ (Freedland 2003: 22–26). For instance, 
legislation on working time, minimum wage levels, disability discrimination, part-time   7
work and protection from unauthorised wage deductions apply not only to employees but 
to all contracts where an individual agrees to personally carry out work without running a 
genuine business of their own (Freedland 2003; Davies and Freedland 2000). The 
Employment Relations Act 1999 empowers the Secretary of State to confer some or all 
employment rights to categories of workers who do not or cannot presently benefit from 
them (EIRO 2002). 
Although the idea of an employee-like category of workers has not historically 
been part of British labour law (as, for instance, in Germany or Italy), these recent attempts 
give employee-like workers more labour law protection (Davies and Freedland 2000). 
However, as Burchell et al. (1999) point out, many aspects of the growing adoption in 
legislation of the concept of the ‘worker’ remain unclear, which reflects the fact that it is 
not yet apparent which criteria the courts will apply in determining where the line between 
a dependent worker and a genuinely independent self-employed individual is to be drawn.  
The legal tests which are currently used by British courts to determine the 
employment status rely on four dimensions, ‘control’, ‘integration’, ‘business reality’ and 
‘mutuality of obligation’ (Deakin and Morris 1998). The control test focuses on the 
discretion and autonomy a worker has. Due to the criticism that control is entirely 
consistent with both an employment contract and a business contract, British courts have 
begun to draw away from using the extent of control as a test (Freedland 2003). Integration 
refers to the way the relationship between the worker and the employer (or principle) is 
organised and how bureaucratic rules (for instance, the inclusion in occupational benefit 
schemes) and disciplinary procedures are used. Business reality gauges the allocation of 
risk and economic dependence between the contracting parties. This test, which looks at 
where the financial risk lies and how workers can profit from the performance of their task,   8
has increasingly gained in importance. Examples of empirical facts of business reality are 
the method of payment, the freedom to hire others, or the provision of own equipment. The 
mutuality of obligation describes the formal evidence of subordination in the contract, 
although the existence of implicit contracts usually complicates the use of this test in court. 
It checks whether there is a mutual obligation to provide work or to accept any work which 
is offered. A lack of a mutual obligation is an indicator that the relationship is not one 
between an employer and an employee, but between independent parties (Burchell et al. 
1999; Deakin and Morris 1998). Freedland (2003) argues that there is little agreement 
between lawyers and courts, “about how strongly a factor has to be present in order to 
characterize a work contract one way or the other” (p. 21). 
Much of the political and legal discussion about dependent self-employment has 
been initiated by trade unions. For instance, in its final agenda of the Congress 2005, the 
TUC notes that “the lack of progress in resolving the uncertainty over employment status 
is a particular concern in industries such as construction, where mass false self-
employment is still a major problem. As a result thousands of workers are denied their 
employment rights” (TUC 2006). At the European level, the ETUC guidelines for 
coordinating collective bargaining in 2006 calls on its members to pay special attention to 
dependent self-employment, stressing that “the figures indicate an upward trend in the 
number of bogus self-employed (almost 23 million), two-thirds of whom may be classed as 
dependent workers, but who have no contractual cover and no social protection worthy of 
the name” (ETUC 2006). 
Trade unions throughout Europe have had substantial difficulties to cope with the 
shift on the labour market towards non-standard forms of work (Heery 2005; EIRO 2002; 
Supiot 2001). With some exceptions, trade unions have traditionally been reluctant to   9
organise self-employed workers. However, European trade unions have increasingly 
started to organise the dependent self-employed (Pernicka 2006; EIRO 2002). Especially 
trade unions representing freelance workers in the media industry, actors and artists were 
among the firsts to represent self-employed workers. In the UK, the National Union of 
Journalists (NUJ), the Broadcasting Entertainment Cinematograph and Theatre Union 
(BECTU) and Equity (the British actors union) also represent dependent self-employed 
workers and have negotiated single employer collective agreements that cover dependent 
self-employed workers also (e.g. concerning minimum payment). The Union of 
Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians (UCATT),  Britain’s only specialist 
construction workers union, has a large number of members who are dependent self-
employed. UCATT is campaigning against the common phenomenon of dependent self-
employment in the British construction industry, especially in relation to work safety: “The 
bogus self employed and cowboy contractors are also making building sites less safe 
because corners are cut and safety training is almost non existent” (UCATT 2003). 
The heterogeneity of dependent self-employed workers makes it difficult for trade 
unions to recruit members and to organise their interests. Thus, trade unions try to attract 
members by offering special assistance to dependent self-employed workers such as 
insurance coverage, assistance in individual disputes and advice on contracts. The example 
of dependent self-employment shows that trade unions have started to include workers 
with non-standard working contracts by offering not only the traditional trade union 
services (i.e. collective bargaining, fairness at work, work safety, etc.), but also new 
services in accordance with the needs of atypical workers (Muehlberger 2004; EIRO 
2002). 
 
   10
3.  Some Evidence and Hypotheses  
 
There is little empirical research on dependent forms of self-employment in the 
UK. In a recent study on the British construction industry, Harvey (2003) argues that the 
strong increase of dependent self-employment is based on two major shifts in British 
public policy. First, while public demand for construction has been reduced due to a 
decline of public consumption, the incentives for private home ownership, which shows a 
more volatile pattern than public demand, have strongly increased, leading to more labour 
flexibility in the construction industry. Second, the 1980s and early 1990s have seen both 
an increase in unemployment and supply-side policy measures to foster self-employment 
(Robson 1998, Taylor 1999). The increase in the British self-employment rate during the 
1980s has been explained by two different hypotheses. While the first stresses that the rise 
in self-employment was connected to the absence of opportunities for paid employment, 
the other explains the strong increase in self-employment with supply-side measures such 
as the reduction in the rate of income tax (Robson 1998, Taylor 1999).  
Harvey (2003) claims that this shift towards dependent self-employment in the 
construction industry means that, firstly, payments for these workers are outside any wage 
bargaining, secondly, they lose their entitlements such as holiday pay, sick pay, 
unemployment benefit, and thirdly, they lose most employment protection for dismissal or 
disciplinary measures. These changes, together with the removal of the employer’s 
obligation to pay any national insurance contributions when outsourcing, led to an overall 
reduction in labour costs through self-employment of roughly 20 to 30 per cent. 
Muehlberger (2004) analyses dependent self-employment in the British insurance 
industry and argues that the work relationships are close to that of employment for two 
reasons. First, she shows that the outsourcing firm controls the work of the dependent self-  11
employed worker. The outsourcing firm not only sets the goals of the worker’s 
performance (e.g. through development of the business plan), but also closely monitors the 
worker by both information technology and regular meetings with supervisors. Second, 
although self-employed, the worker is substantially integrated into the business of the 
outsourcing firm. Even though the worker operates from its own premises, he or she 
nevertheless works under the logo and the name of the outsourcing firm. Muehlberger 
(2004) shows that the outsourcing firm successfully introduces hierarchical elements into 
the business relationship and it places the worker into subordination. 
However, unlike employees, the dependent self-employed worker bears (part of) 
the entrepreneurial risk. For instance, employed insurance agents have a fixed basic 
income plus performance related bonuses, self-employed agents only earn their 
commissions. Demand fluctuations, the competitiveness of the outsourcing firm and events 
that prevent the dependent self-employed worker from working (e.g. illness) are risks the 
worker has to take. In sum, Muehlberger (2004) argues that firms use hierarchical forms of 
outsourcing to reduce the principal-agent problem. Outsourcing workers shifts part of the 
entrepreneurial risk to the worker and detaches the outsourcing firm from employment and 
social security law, which allows the firm to gain financial and organisational flexibility. 
Simultaneously, it keeps a substantial part of control over labour. 
Muehlberger’s case study suggests that dependent self-employed workers are as a 
group different from both employees and (independent) self-employed individuals. We 
hypothesise that dependent self-employed workers differ from both groups in terms of 
their observable characteristics. The second hypothesis we put forward concerns the effects 
of labour market experience and skills. The discussion above suggests that dependent self-
employed workers are dependent on the outsourcing firm and have less autonomy than   12
their independent counterparts. For the empirical analysis we use human capital variables 
as proxies to for these characteristics. Consequently, we put forward the hypotheses that 
dependent self-employed workers have on average lower or fewer labour market skills, 
less labour market attachment and, thus, less autonomy than self-employed workers.  
 
 
4. Identifying  Dependent Self-employed Workers  
 
As discussed above, both labour courts and legislation find it difficult to specify 
dependent self-employed workers due to the heterogeneous nature of conditions involved. 
In addition, survey data did not allow the identification of dependent self-employed 
workers until recently. The British Labour Force Survey (BLFS) of spring 1999 was the 
first European survey that included variables permitting the identification of dependent 
self-employed workers. We use data from the more recent BLFS 2002 (spring) for an 
analysis of the characteristics of dependent self-employed workers and define a dependent 
self-employed as a self-employed worker who has no employees and only one customer.
2 
Applying this definition, we identify 527 dependent self-employed workers. The 
comparison groups are 32,925 employees and 5,273 self-employed, who either have at 
least one employee or more than one customer, or both. 
The sample characteristics, tabulated in Table 1, show that men are over-
represented amongst the (independent) self-employed and, even more so, amongst the 
                                                 
2 We want to stress that the BLFS relies on the self-reporting of the employment status, which does not 
necessarily correspond to the legal classification. Burchell et al.'s (1999) survey of a representative sample of 
4,000 workers found that 30 per cent have an ambiguous employment status, and that 8 per cent of them were 
legally classified as 'self-employed’. Another classification problem could arise from the fact that some 
individuals may be classified as employees in tax issues, but as self-employed in employment issues (or vice 
versa) and it is not clear which labour market status these individuals report for the BLFS. In addition, we 
might classify some “genuine” self-employed as dependent self-employed because of temporary fluctuations 
in the number employed or the number of customers, or both.   13
dependent self-employed workers. Roughly 78 per cent of the dependent self-employed 
workers in the sample are men. Dependent self-employed workers are, on average, older 
than employees, but younger than the self-employed. The three groups do not differ much 
in their ethnic compositions, except that there are relatively more Asians among the self-
employed that among the other two groups. The sample characteristics on gender and age 
are comparable to the study of Cowling and Taylor (2001) on the self-employed using the 
5
th wave (1995) of the BHPS. They divide the self-employed between the those with and 
those without employees and find that men are more likely to be both self-employed with 
employees and self-employed without employees and that the self-employed without 
employees are younger than those with employees. In contrast to our results, however, they 
observe a low probability of non-whites being self-employed with employees and an 
overrepresentation of foreigners amongst the self-employed without employees.  
The sample characteristics show that the self-employed are more likely to have a 
university degree than the other two groups and, in general, tend to be workers with more 
formal education. The dependent self-employed, in contrast, are about as likely to have 
higher education as employees, but are more likely to have A-levels and are also more 
likely to have no qualification. 
The self-employed are more likely to be cohabiting with a spouse than the other 
two groups. The self-employed are also more likely to co-reside with a child under the age 
of 19. With respect to pre-school children, we do not find a difference between the three 
groups of workers. Residential tenure is highest among self-employed persons and lowest 
among employees, with dependent self-employed workers in the middle. However, there 
are, in sum, no big differences in residential tenure between the three groups.    14
Looking at regular working hours, though, we see a rather strong difference 
between the groups. The self-employed work on average 41 hours per week, employees 
work 34 hours, and dependent self-employed workers work 37 hours per week. Current job 
tenure is longest for the self-employed and it is shortest for the dependent self-employed. 
Most dependent self-employed workers are in a skilled trade, with comparatively 
few working in clerical occupations and in sales and other customer services. They are 
mainly working in the construction and the financial services industries, as also 
documented in Harvey (2003) and Muehlberger (2004). 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
We estimate multi-nomial logit models to compare the three groups of workers. 
These multi-nomial logit models estimate the odds of being a dependent self-employed 
worker versus the odds of being an employee, the odds of being an employee versus being 
self-employed, and indirectly, the odds of being dependent self-employed versus being 
self-employed. In order to identify the model, one group has to serve as the comparison 
group, we chose the largest group, employees. (The estimates are not changed by the 
choice of comparison group.) All results are presented in relative risk ratios, RRR (the 
exponentiated coefficients). The RRRs give the odds of being in one group versus the odds 
of being an employee. A RRR greater (less) than one indicates that the risk of being in a 
group is greater (smaller) for higher values of a variable. The results are tabulated in Table 
2. 
The first of our models, which serves as a benchmark for the other specification 
below, uses only contemporaneous variables to the employment status. The estimation 
reveals that men have a greater risk of being self-employed, both dependently and   15
independently, than women. The odds for man to be a dependent self-employed rather than 
an employee are more than twice than for a woman. We also estimate that the odds for 
being self-employed are greater the older the worker is, but at a declining rate (RRRs of 
more (less) than one for age (age squared)). The same is true, although to a lesser degree, 
when comparing the dependent self-employed with employees. The odds for being 
dependent self-employed are greater the older the worker is with a slightly declining rate. 
Workers with a pre-school aged child are more likely to work either as self-
employed or dependent self-employed than employed. Workers who are married or 
cohabiting are more likely to be self-employed or dependent self-employed, although the 
RRRs are statistically significant at conventional levels, the difference between employees 
and the dependent self-employed is rather small. The results from residential tenures do 
not show an easily interpretable pattern, longer residential tenure is estimated to be 
associated with greater odds of working self-employed. 
An novel result emerges from the analysis of ethnic background. We admit that the 
used dichotomy of white and non-white is a crude instrument, but the small number of 
observations forced our hands. Nevertheless, we estimate that workers from non-white 
ethnic backgrounds have lower odds of working as dependent self-employed than as 
employed. They are, however, more likely to work as self-employed, all other things being 
equal.  
When we consider formal education and the odds of being an employed worker or 
dependent self-employed, we find that workers with more formal education are less likely 
to be dependent self-employed than employed. In contrast, for the (independent) self-
employed, we find those with an A level (or equivalent) and with a higher degree have a 
higher risk of being self-employed (than employed).   16
The estimates show that dependent self-employment is associated with more labour 
market fluctuation, those with short job tenures are more likely to be working as dependent 
self-employed than as employees, in comparison to those with considerable longer job 
tenures. The reverse is true for the self-employed, workers with short job tenures are less 
likely to work self-employed than as employees.  
How significant are these findings? We have performed a Wald test to test the 
differences between the dependent self-employed, the self-employed, and the employed 
and are reassured that the differences are, indeed, statistically significant (p-value of less 
than 0.00). 
The BLFS also provides variables that gauge the respondent’s labour market status 
one year ago. While such retrospective data may be afflicted with non-random error, we 
use them here as it comes closest to longitudinal data, which would allow the analysis of 
workers over time. We use these additional variables in Model 2, also tabulated in Table 2. 
These additional variables describe the job situation a year before the current interview in 
terms of whether the worker was working part- or full-time, whether s/he supervised other 
employees or not, and the standard occupational category (SOC) of the job.  
We first note that most estimated odds do change little when we include the 
additional variables in our model. Changes occur for the association between formal 
education and working dependent self-employed and between job tenure and working 
dependent self-employed. The results now show clearly that all levels of formal education, 
in comparison to no formal education, are associated with odds of working dependent self-
employed of less than one. This implies that dependent self-employed workers are those 
with poor qualifications, possibly the first ones to be laid off in times of restructuring. In 
addition, the results for job tenures now show more clearly that dependent self-  17
employment is associated with high labour market fluctuation, those with short job-tenures 
are more likely to be working dependent self-employed rather than employed.
3  
We see that those who were working part-time a year ago are more likely to work 
dependent self-employed, and also self-employed. Those who had a job that included 
supervision of other workers in its duties are found to have rather low odds of working 
dependent (or independent) self-employed. These results suggest that workers who are on 
the lower rungs of the occupational hierarchy, be it because of poor education, because of 
their age, their low job tenure, or because they worked part-time before, are the ones who 
are most likely to work dependent self-employed. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
We argue that workers who have employment contracts that are between 
employment and self-employment are economically and hierarchically dependent on the 
firm they contract with. While earlier research (Muehlberger 2004) has highlighted how 
dependency is created, we looked at the characteristics of the dependent self-employed and 
how these workers differ from employees and the self-employed.  
We have shown that the dependent self-employed are statistically significantly 
different from employees and also from the (independent) self-employed. This finding 
supports legal arguments that these different groups of workers require different legal 
treatment (Supiot 2001). 
                                                 
3 We have also experimented with models that include a variable that details whether or not the worker was 
working dependent self-employed one year ago. These results indicate that those who were previously 
working dependent self-employed have a great risk of working dependent self-employed at the time of the 
interview. This is consistent with the findings of Cowling and Taylor (2001) and other international data 
(Berton et al. 2003).   18
In comparison to employees, men have greater odds of working dependent self-
employed, also those who are older, married, white, and those with low education and a 
low job tenure. Our results suggest that dependent self-employment is used by firms to 
increase labour flexibility, because dependent self-employed workers have low formal 
skills and low job tenure. The dependent self-employed have a lower labour market 
attachment with a higher labour market fluctuation than employees. Furthermore, we found 
few transitions out of dependent self-employment: workers who were dependent self-
employed a year ago, have a high chance to be also presently dependent self-employed.  
Consequently, in agreement with Sciarra (2004), Freedland (2003) and Supiot 
(2001), we argue that those workers are in need of labour protection. Labour law reflects 
the societal compromise to divide rents between employers and employees. The emergence 
of dependent self-employment demonstrates that labour law has not been able to keep up 
with the changes in the labour market. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Summary statistics by employment status. 
 Employee  Self-employed  Dependent self-
employed 
  Mean  (SD) Mean  (SD) Mean  (SD) 
Male  0.574   0.738   0.778   
Age  38.908 (11.826) 44.814 (10.391) 42.725  (11.785) 
Ethnicity           
White  0.951   0.942   0.953   
Mixed  0.004   0.003   0.004   
Asian  0.026   0.034   0.017   
Black  0.012   0.008   0.017   
Chinese  0.003   0.005   0.006   
Other  0.005   0.008   0.004   
Lives with spouse  0.557    0.705    0.632   
Kids under 19 years (#)  0.762  (1.023)  0.862  (1.113)  0.753  (0.992) 
Kids under 5 years (#)  0.171  (0.451)  0.179  (0.474)  0.180  (0.485) 
Kids 5-9 years (#)  0.201  (0.490)  0.238  (0.537)  0.203  (0.480) 
Highest qualification           
Degree or equivalent  0.144    0.190    0.140   
Higher  education  0.076   0.079   0.078   
GCE A level or equiv.  0.274    0.331    0.362   
GCSE A-C level  
or equiv.  0.245   0.152   0.120   
Other  qualification  0.143   0.118   0.148   
No  qualification 0.119   0.129   0.152   
Residential tenure           
< 1 year  0.104    0.072    0.097   
1 - 2 years  0.102    0.082    0.093   
2 - 3 years  0.082    0.072    0.072   
3 - 5 years  0.127    0.122    0.123   
5 - 10 years  0.187    0.200    0.175   
>= 10 years  0.398    0.452    0.440   
Job  characteristics:          
Regular working hours(1)  33.747 (11.955) 41.151 (18.085) 36.573  (18.668) 
Job tenure           
< 3 months  0.042    0.018    0.070   
3 - 6 months  0.037    0.021    0.061   
6 - 12 months  0.075    0.039    0.065   
1 - 2 years  0.149    0.084    0.118   
2 - 5 years  0.252    0.164    0.211   
5 - 10 years  0.159    0.165    0.157   
10 - 20 years  0.188    0.289    0.176   
>= 20 years  0.099    0.220    0.142   
Occupation             21
Managers and  
sen. officials  0.175   0.193   0.042   
Professionals  0.075   0.124   0.135   
Associate prof.  
and techn.  0.107   0.142   0.131   
Clerical  occupation  0.133   0.028   0.040   
Skilled  trade  0.120   0.310   0.380   
Personal  service 0.051   0.054   0.044   
Sales and  
customer services  0.102   0.029   0.011   
Operatives  0.113   0.081   0.129   
Elementary  0.123   0.038   0.089   
Same occupation as t-1  0.922   0.963   0.920   
Industry           
Agriculture  0.010   0.056   0.053   
Energy  0.018   0.003   0.009   
Manufacturing  0.241   0.061   0.089   
Construction  0.070   0.211   0.355   
Distribution  0.245   0.196   0.046   
Transport  0.087   0.070   0.093   
Banking and finance  0.201    0.193    0.184   
Public  administration  0.084   0.098   0.076   
Other  services  0.044   0.113   0.095   
Employment at t-1           
Self-employed.  
w/o employees  0.011   0.657   0.784   
Part-time    0.208   0.182   0.209   
Supervisory    0.381   0.039   0.072   
Occupation           
Managers and  
sen. officials  0.172   0.191   0.059   
Professionals  0.076   0.123   0.121   
Associate prof.  
and techn.  0.106   0.143   0.131   
Clerical  occupations  0.132   0.030   0.046   
Skilled  trade 0.123   0.306   0.364   
Personal  services  0.052   0.054   0.044   
Sales and  
customer services  0.103   0.031   0.017   
Operatives  0.113   0.082   0.131   
Elementary  0.124   0.039   0.087   
N 32,931  5,273  527 
(1) # of observations: employee (32925), self-employed (5273), dependent self-employed (527). 
 Table 2: Estimated risk of self-employment and dependent self-employment.  
  Model 1  Model 2 
  Dependent self-
employed  Self-employed  Dependent self-
employed  Self-employed 
  RRR (SE) RRR (SE) RRR (SE) RRR (SE) 
Personal characteristics          
  Male  2.177 (0.041) 1.748 (0.005) 2.050 (0.026) 1.550 (0.010) 
  Age  1.080 (0.003) 1.149 (0.001) 1.073 (0.004) 1.165 (0.001) 
 Age  squared/100  0.948  (0.003)  0.887 (0.001) 0.950 (0.004) 0.872 (0.001) 
  kids05  1.282 (0.011) 1.229 (0.003) 1.194 (0.009) 1.247 (0.003) 
  marchk  1.024 (0.014) 1.082 (0.004) 1.068 (0.022) 1.127 (0.008) 
  Non  white  0.865 (0.074) 1.298 (0.014) 0.840 (0.074) 1.392 (0.013) 
Residential tenure          
  tenure_1  1.022*  (0.043) 1.085 (0.025)  1.100*  (0.065) 1.057 (0.016) 
  tenure_2  1.039*  (0.025) 1.162 (0.013) 1.142 (0.035) 1.192 (0.005) 
  ten_long  1.065 (0.028) 1.097 (0.008) 1.118 (0.031) 1.180 (0.007) 
Education          
  edu_3  1.073 (0.012) 1.263 (0.005) 0.961 (0.009) 1.055 (0.003) 
  edu_4  0.550 (0.034) 0.870 (0.001) 0.588 (0.023) 0.977 (0.002) 
  edu_5  0.836 (0.016) 0.828 (0.003) 0.853 (0.019) 0.898 (0.003) 
  edu_top  0.851 (0.007) 1.329 (0.013) 0.941 (0.007) 1.371 (0.008) 
Jobtenure          
  jobten_1  2.306 (0.059) 0.387 (0.008) 2.208 (0.082) 0.394 (0.009) 
  jobten_2  1.923 (0.088) 0.510 (0.008) 2.115 (0.122) 0.535 (0.005) 
  jobten_3  1.290 (0.048) 0.471 (0.002)  0.991*
  (0.044) 0.402 (0.003) 
  jobten_4  1.143 (0.018) 0.513 (0.003) 0.894 (0.037) 0.414 (0.003) 
 jobten_5  1.010*  (0.013)  0.528  (0.004) 0.883 (0.015) 0.450 (0.003) 
  jobten_6  1.081 (0.035) 0.722 (0.005)  1.044*  (0.033) 0.695 (0.004) 
Last year:          
  Part-time          2.029 (0.064) 1.435 (0.006) 
  Superviser          0.107 (0.006) 0.028 (0.000) 
SOC (t-1)          
  oysoc_2          2.203 (0.012) 0.592 (0.002) 
  oysoc_3          1.637 (0.167) 0.502 (0.012) 
  oysoc_4          0.458 (0.054) 0.076 (0.001) 
  oysoc_5          3.126 (0.080) 0.722 (0.005) 
  oysoc_6          1.225 (0.081) 0.466 (0.005) 
  oysoc_7          0.196 (0.004) 0.113 (0.001) 
  oysoc_8          1.092 (0.053) 0.190 (0.001) 
  oysoc_9          0.661 (0.010) 0.102 (0.000) 
  SE, no employees 
 (t-1)          
Note: Estimation results from a multi-nomial logit regression, comparison group are employees. Sample sizes are 
32,925 employees, 5,273 self-employed, and 527 dependent self-employed. All models include 13 indicator 
variables for area of residence. All estimates are statistically significant on a 10% error-level, or less, unless 
indicated by * (the test is against the alternative that the RRR equals 1).  